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Opinion

Cognitive Phenotypes and the
Evolution of Animal Decisions
Tamra C. Mendelson,1,*,@ Courtney L. Fitzpatrick,2 Mark
E. Hauber,3 Charles H. Pence,4 Rafael L. Rodríguez,5
Rebecca J. Safran,6 Caitlin A. Stern,7 and Jeffrey R. Stevens8
Despite the clear ﬁtness consequences of animal decisions, the science of
animal decision making in evolutionary biology is underdeveloped compared
with decision science in human psychology. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁeld lacks a
conceptual framework that deﬁnes and describes the relevant components
of a decision, leading to imprecise language and concepts. The ‘judgment
and decision-making’ (JDM) framework in human psychology is a powerful tool
for framing and understanding human decisions, and we apply it here to
components of animal decisions, which we refer to as ‘cognitive phenotypes’.
We distinguish multiple cognitive phenotypes in the context of a JDM framework and highlight empirical approaches to characterize them as evolvable
traits.

Trends
Animal decisions are the result of multiple interacting cognitive phenotypes.
Proximate and ultimate explanations of
decisions require the characterization
of cognitive phenotypes.
We provide an ontology of cognitive
phenotypes in a JDM framework.
Empirical examples of successfully
characterized cognitive phenotypes
are highlighted.

Opening the Black Box of Animal Decision Making
The ﬁtness consequences of animal decisions (see Glossary), from mating to feeding to ﬁnding
shelter, are relatively easy to characterize compared with the cognitive processes that drive
them. As for any complex trait, decisions emerge from the interaction of multiple components.
We consider each of these components to be a unique cognitive phenotype (Figure 1). By
adopting this nomenclature, we emphasize that any component of the decision-making process
can vary among individuals, have genetic and environmental components of variation, and be
subject to selection. Characterizing the cognitive phenotypes that underlie animal decisions is
essential for understanding how decision making evolves.
For decades, researchers have struggled to describe the internal (cognitive) components of
animal decisions. During the early 20th century, behaviorists such as B.F. Skinner approached
cognition as a black box, insisting that internal processes can never be inferred from observations of behavior [1]. However, modern ethologists and behavioral ecologists have made a
strong case for inferring cognition from carefully designed behavioral experiments [2–5]. Moreover, as advancing technology reveals the neural architecture of cognition with unprecedented
precision [6–9], we are poised to make substantive links between animal decisions in the wild,
the cognitive phenotypes that produce those decisions, and the ﬁtness consequences that
shape them [10,11].
Despite this progress, behavioral ecology lacks a cohesive framework for understanding the
decision-making process [12,13], often leading to imprecise language and concepts when
describing animal decisions in natural systems. Researchers often use the same term to refer to
different cognitive phenotypes. For example, ‘discrimination’ might be used to refer to the
perceptual ability of an animal to distinguish two similar stimuli, or it might refer to the tendency to
mate with conspeciﬁcs over heterospeciﬁcs; yet, the two situations involve different cognitive
and physiological processes (e.g., [7]). The absence of a cohesive decision framework is also
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Figure 1. Cognitive Phenotypes Underlying Animal Decisions. Animal behavior is initiated by information and
culminates in action. The two center boxes represent the decision-making component of the process, which is modeled in
psychology as a combination of judgments and decisions. Terms commonly used in behavioral ecology are mapped onto
this framework and represent cognitive phenotypes that might vary among individuals and affect relative ﬁtness. Feedback
is assumed within and between all components, and components and their interactions can be affected by context, that is,
the dynamic social and ecological environment in which a cognitive phenotype is expressed.

problematic when behaviors are used to infer particular cognitive phenotypes, because different
cognitive processes can lead to the same behavioral output [1,12,14]. For example, a female
might mate with a heterospeciﬁc because of any number of internal processes, including an
inability to perceive a difference between conspeciﬁcs and heterospeciﬁcs or the absence of a
preference (see below).
We propose that problems linking behavioral and cognitive phenotypes can be mitigated by
adopting the robust conceptual framework that guides research in human decision making. This
framework distinguishes two main categories of cognitive phenotypes: ‘judgments’ and
‘decisions’. ‘Judgments’ refer to how individuals acquire and process information to arrive
at an understanding of the situation or state of the world. ‘Decisions’ refer to the processes by
which individuals use judgments to arrive at a course of action [15]. In other words, individuals
can vary in two main ways: how they ‘see’ the world, and what they decide to do about it. This
distinction forms the foundation of human decision-making science and frames a highly
productive research agenda in human psychology [12–16].
Here, we integrate this JDM framework into behavioral ecology, assigning cognitive phenotypes
such as discrimination, recognition, preference, and choice, to one of these two categories
(Figure 1). This framework is a novel way for behavioral ecologists to consider animal decisions
and brings multiple advantages. First, it speciﬁes two broad classes of process with fundamentally
different functions that can be modeled distinctly (e.g., Bayesian inference for judgments versus
utility maximization for decisions; see below). Second, this framework emphasizes the cognitive
process over the behavioral end product. These cognitive phenotypes represent the relevant axes
of variation, continuous or categorical, along which individuals can differ and upon which selection
can act. Linking this variation with variation in ﬁtness serves a fundamental goal of behavioral
ecology [17–19]. Third, identifying discrete cognitive phenotypes and anchoring them to a JDM
framework clariﬁes their role in the decision-making process, which in turn allows us to identify and
compare homologous processes across taxa [20] and determine which experimental approaches
reveal the phenotype of interest (Boxes 1 and 2). Finally, the study of decision making is a
multidisciplinary science. Integrating the JDM framework into behavioral ecology facilitates a
shared understanding of concepts and techniques across the ﬁelds of human and nonhuman
decision making, advancing our understanding of decision making across disciplines.

Assessment: extracting a
measurable value of a stimulus that
indicates quality or quantity.
Bayes’ Rule: an algorithm for
rationally updating a prior belief about
the state of the world given new
evidence.
Categorization: assigning two or
more similar stimuli to a set and
distinguishing between stimuli in
different sets.
Choice: the cognitive process of
selecting an action in the face of
alternatives.
Cognition: the mechanisms by
which animals acquire, process,
store, and act on information [46].
Cognitive phenotype: a discrete
cognitive feature that can be
quantitatively measured and speciﬁed
in terms of its neurobiology,
physiology, or behavior (adapted
from [47]).
Decision: an umbrella term that
refers to the cognitive processes that
evaluate and select options to arrive
at a course of action.
Discrimination: distinguishing two or
more distinct stimuli.
Judgment: making an inference or
drawing a conclusion about the state
of the world based on information
from the internal and external
environment.
Ontology: a formal speciﬁcation of
the concepts or entities, and the
relations among those entities,
comprising a particular domain of
discourse.
Preference: the cognitive encoding
of a ranking of options.
Recognition: responding predictably
to a previously experienced and
remembered stimulus.

Here, we begin by describing judgment and decision making as implemented in the ﬁeld of
human psychology and discuss cases where it has been implicitly applied in behavioral ecology.
We then identify concepts that form the core of a shared ontology, that is, a formal speciﬁcation
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Box 1. Experimental Approaches
Behavioral ecologists typically study decision making using choice tests, in which they present options to an individual
that indicates choice with an action, such as moving toward an option or pulling a lever [48]. However, that action can
result from multiple judgments and decisions, and a choice test cannot always distinguish among the various cognitive
phenotypes that might underlie the action. If an individual fails to choose one option over another, it is unclear whether the
individual failed to make the judgment (e.g. failed to discriminate) or decided not to act (e.g. lacked a preference for one
stimulus over the other).
Therefore, additional information that complements a behavioral choice test is sometimes needed to specify the cognitive
phenotypes underlying animal decisions. In particular, neural responses (e.g., electrophysiological recordings or
magnetic resonance imaging), physiological responses (e.g., breathing rate, heart rate, or hormone levels), or behavioral
responses other than choice (e.g., eye gaze or habituation–dishabituation) can be used to test for and characterize any of
the cognitive phenotypes (Table I).
Discrimination can be revealed by presenting two stimuli simultaneously or sequentially and measuring neural, physiological, or behavioral responses. Different responses across stimulus types demonstrate discrimination.
To demonstrate recognition, neural, physiological, or behavioral variables should respond predictably to stimuli that have
been previously experienced and differently to stimuli that have not been experienced. Recognition tests are distinguished from simple discrimination tests by determining whether subjects distinguish speciﬁcally between familiar
(remembered) and novel stimuli.
For categorization, measured variables should respond both similarly to multiple exemplars of a given set of stimuli and
differently to multiple exemplars not in the set.
Demonstrating assessment requires comparing the responses of measured variables with features that are known to
indicate the quantity or quality of a stimulus (e.g., ornaments or odors) to determine whether and how individuals attend to
those features.
Preference can be revealed by activity that exhibits a ranked response to varying stimuli.
Choice tests easily demonstrate choices by requiring an individual to choose between two or more simultaneously
presented options. The neural and physiological correlates of that choice can be identiﬁed in a successful choice test and
then measured in a subsequent test to demonstrate choice even if action is impeded.

Table I. Experimental Approaches to Identifying Cognitive Phenotypesa
Response
Variable
Neural

Physiological

Behavioral

Techniques

Cognitive
Phenotype

Refs

Circuit visualization: in vivo imaging of active neural circuits

Discrimination

[7]

Electrophysiology: measures ﬁring patterns of individual neurons

Preference

[8]

Magnetic resonance imaging: measures blood ﬂow and neural
activation of brain regions

Choice

[49]

Breathing rate: measures the rate of respiration

Discrimination

[50]

Heart rate: measures the rate of heart activity

Discrimination

[51]

Hormone level: measures levels of hormones in blood, feces,
saliva, or other bodily ﬂuids

Preference

[52]

Eye gaze: measures the direction and duration of eye gaze

Assessment

[53]

Habitation–dishabituation: measures when individuals can detect
a difference between stimuli to which they have versus have not
been repeatedly exposed.

Categorization

[54]

Behavioral trials: measures response to options using behavioral
variables other than direct selection of options or association time
(e.g., type of display or intensity of activity)

Discrimination,
categorization

[55]

a

A host of techniques that measure neural, physiological, and behavioral responses can complement a behavioral choice
test to pinpoint which components of the decision-making process contribute to a given behavioral outcome. Examples
of cognitive phenotypes identiﬁed in the literature are provided, with references.
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of the concepts or entities that deﬁne an intellectual discipline and the relations among them [21].
This ontology provides more than a shared lexicon; it generates fundamental conceptual
distinctions and can elucidate relations among cognitive processes that are frequently conﬂated
in the literature. We explore common usage of these terms within behavioral ecology, provide
descriptions consistent with a JDM framework, and offer alternative experimental approaches
that could help identify each phenotype (Box 1), highlighting empirical examples (Box 2). Our
goal is to advance a framework that facilitates an evolutionary perspective on animal decisions. A
JDM view of decision making enables researchers to characterize relevant cognitive phenotypes, quantify variation in those phenotypes among individuals, and link ﬁtness outcomes to
that variation.

The Judgment–Decision-Making Dichotomy
Since the 1940s, the ﬁeld of judgment and decision making has emerged from the integration of
cognitive psychology, social psychology, and economics to focus on two areas. One area
applies principles of psychophysics and mathematical psychology to investigate how humans
make judgments about the state of the world; the other draws from economics to explore how
humans make decisions [15]. Although these areas developed through different approaches
and questions, they represent an important conceptual distinction between making inferences
and making choices [12].
‘Judgments’ refer to how individuals assess information to arrive at an understanding of their
world [15]. All organisms use various imperfect information (sensation, memory, etc.) to make a
judgment or inference about the true state of the world or to predict future states of the world.
The primary measure of judgments is accuracy, that is, the correspondence between the
perceived and true state of the world. Often Bayes’ rule is used to assess accuracy by
Box 2. Empirical Examples of Cognitive Phenotypes
Behavior Demonstrates Discrimination and Categorization without Preference in Sticklebacks
Kozak et al. [55] showed that male sticklebacks (Figure IA) court conspeciﬁc and heterospeciﬁc females with equivalent
intensity; however, they vary the type of courtship display depending on the species, using behavior that is typical of the
species being courted. This indicates an ability to discriminate the two species without a preference for one over the
other. This experiment also demonstrated categorization; males exhibited the same display to multiple individuals of one
set and a different display to multiple individuals of another set.
Neuronal Spike Rates Demonstrate Categorization in Zebra Finches
Hauber et al. [9] measured the spike rates of single neurons in the auditory forebrain of female zebra ﬁnches (Figure IB) in
response to male songs. Higher spike rates were recorded in response to conspeciﬁc songs compared with songs of two
heterospeciﬁcs; each stimulus category was represented by multiple individual exemplars. However, spike rates in
response to the two heterospeciﬁcs did not differ, suggesting the categorization of conspeciﬁc song.
Eye Tracking Demonstrates Assessment In Peahens
Female peahens (Figure IC) have been shown to choose males based on the number of eyespots in their train and the
length of their long ‘ﬁshtail’ feather. Yorzinski et al. [53] outﬁtted peahens with an eye-tracking device to monitor which
features of a male were attended to by females during mate choice. Females paid most attention to the eyespots on the
lower segments of the train as well as the ﬁshtail, thus empirically supporting and quantifying assessment of these
features.
Neuronal Spike Rates Demonstrate Preference in Gryllus bimaculatus
Kastarakos and Hedwig [8] showed that the strength of the phonotactic response of female Gryllus bimaculatus crickets
to variation in male chirp pulse duration varies continuously (Figure ID). When exposed to the same set of stimuli, activity
patterns of one neuron matched the graded female phonotaxis behavior, demonstrating a cognitively encoded ranking of
options (preference) that corresponded to female decisions.
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(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

Figure I. (A) Threespine stickleback Gasterosteus aculeatus (credit Piet Spaans), (B) Zebra ﬁnch Taeniopygia guttata
(credit Keith Gerstung), (C) Indian peafowl Pavo cristatus (credit Jessica Yorzinksi), (D) Two-spotted cricket Gryllus
bimaculatus (credit Gerd Rossen/www.digital-nature-photography.com).

determining whether an individual is accurately updating its belief about the state of the world
given new information [22].
By contrast, decisions refer to how individuals determine a course of action or choose among
different options [15]. Whereas judgments are typically modeled in a Bayesian framework, much
of the study of decisions has come from economics and utility theory: to continue performing well
in the market, an individual should choose options that offer the highest utility [23]. There is no
measure of accuracy for decisions because they do not directly refer to the state of the world.
The question of what is a good decision depends upon how well that decision coheres to some
criterion. In economics, that criterion is expected utility maximization; in evolutionary biology, it is
ﬁtness maximization.
Although conceptually and empirically separable, judgments and decisions are nonetheless
inextricably linked. Judgments are rarely made without a subsequent selection among options;
decisions often require some evaluation of the state of the world; and the processes can feed
back on one another [12]. For example, when a female spider encounters a male conspeciﬁc,
she may categorize him as a potential mate (judgment #1) and simultaneously or sequentially
assess his quality (judgment #2). Depending on these judgments, she may allow him to
approach (decision #1) and then mate with him (decision #2). Early decisions can modify
subsequent judgments, which in turn can modify subsequent decisions. For example, if she
decides to eat the male instead of mating with him, assessment may focus on nutritional quality.
Thus, as for any decision, copulation requires both judgments and decisions that can act
sequentially, simultaneously, and iteratively.
We are not the ﬁrst to apply this kind of framework to behavioral ecology. Blumstein and Bouskila
[14] presented an ‘assessment’ and decision-making framework, where assessment was
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essentially equivalent to psychology's judgment. They pointed out that cognitive processes are
difﬁcult to glean from behavior alone, and that knowledge of ‘informational states’ (judgments) is
critical (see Figure 1 in [14]). We extend the ideas of Blumstein and Bouskila [14], but rather than
inventing a new framework and associated terminology, we suggest that JDM, as a productive
psychological framework already in place, can serve to clarify thinking in behavioral ecology and
help identify the proximate bases and ultimate consequences of animal decisions.

Developing a Decision-Making Ontology
Blumstein and Bouskila [14] demonstrated that behavioral ecologists might already implicitly
distinguish between judgments and decisions. Nonetheless, many terms that describe the
components of animal decisions are used inconsistently, interchangeably, and without a guiding
framework in which to organize and distinguish them. To clarify terms in a way that is useful for
behavioral researchers, we explored the use of six common and often interchangeably used
terms from behavioral ecology: assessment, categorization, discrimination, recognition, preference, and choice. We conducted a targeted literature search to examine how these terms
were deﬁned or used in three well-studied behavioral domains: mating, foraging, and habitat
selection. For each term, we searched in Web of Sciencei using the stem of the term (e.g.
‘recogn*’ or ‘choice’), other terms that speciﬁed one of the three behavioral domains (e.g.,
‘forag*’, ‘mate’, or ‘habitat’), and the terms ‘deﬁnition’ or ‘deﬁned’. For each term, we identiﬁed a
minimum of two articles per behavioral domain with clearly labeled deﬁnitions, as well as multiple
additional articles from which deﬁnitions could be gleaned from usage. Based on this qualitative
analysis, here we summarize usages across domains for each term and offer new or modiﬁed
descriptions of each term that distinguish them one from another within the JDM framework.
Judgment
The concept of judgment is not widely applied in behavioral ecology. We advocate a description
consistent with the psychological literature, as ‘making an inference or drawing a conclusion
about the state of the world based on information from the internal and external environment’.
Four processes associated with judgments (discrimination, categorization, assessment, and
recognition) are commonly used in behavioral ecology.
Discrimination
Discrimination is arguably the most basic cognitive process involved in a judgment. Environments (stimuli) vary along multiple dimensions, and distinguishing natural variants can be critical
to the ﬁtness of an individual. The concept of discrimination is used broadly in all three domains of
behavioral ecology examined here. In some cases, it is deﬁned as a cognitive process preceding
action [24], but is more commonly deﬁned as an action, when animals behave differently toward
one stimulus versus another [25–27]. We consider discrimination, rather than an action, to be the
cognitive process of ‘distinguishing two or more distinct stimuli’.
Categorization
Categorization is another process used to infer the state of the world and is predicated on
discrimination. Categorization is used often in the mating and foraging domains of behavioral
ecology, but rarely in the context of habitat selection. Unlike discrimination, categorization is
most commonly described as a cognitive process [28,29], although actions can be used to
identify it. We describe categorization as ‘assigning two or more similar stimuli to a set and
distinguishing between stimuli in different sets’. Therefore, demonstrating categorization
requires multiple test stimuli that either do or do not belong to a set of interest.
Assessment
Assessment is used across the three examined domains of behavioral ecology. Most commonly,
assessment describes the acquisition of information related to the quantity or quality of a given
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stimulus, implicitly or explicitly referring to the ﬁtness consequences of that stimulus [30,31].
Unlike discrimination or categorization, the concept of assessment applies to a single stimulus
rather than two or more and is best described as ‘extracting a measurable value of a stimulus
that indicates quality or quantity’.
Recognition
Recognition is frequently used in the mating domain of behavioral ecology, but less so in foraging
or habitat selection. In the mating literature, recognition describes a response to any member of
a certain category, as in ‘mate recognition’ or ‘kin recognition’ (e.g., [32,33]). By contrast, in
psychology, the concept of recognition generally emphasizes a role of memory [34,35]. To ‘recognize’ a stimulus is to experience and process it again, meaning that the stimulus has been
previously processed. Therefore, recognition is ‘responding predictably to a previously experienced and remembered stimulus’. A good example of recognition is individual recognition in
paper wasps, in which individuals are remembered based on facial patterns [36]; however, many
cases of mate recognition [37], competitor recognition [38], kin recognition, predator recognition, and species recognition, in which animals respond to sets of individuals rather than
remembered stimuli, are better described as categorization than recognition. Framing these
phenomena as categorization allows us to apply existing theories in psychology to behavioral
ecology (e.g., exemplar versus prototype theories of categorization [39]) to better understand
how these judgments are made.
Decision
‘Decision’ is an umbrella term that refers to the cognitive processes that evaluate and select
options to arrive at a course of action. A decision itself is not an overt action or behavior;
individuals may decide before acting. Yet, because decisions are further ‘downstream’ in the
decision-making process (Figure 1), behavioral tests may provide more direct measures of
decisions than of judgments.
Preference
Preference is used in all three behavioral ecology domains examined and typically is described as
the act of selecting one or some options over others (e.g., [25,40,41]). Certainly behavioral
experiments can identify preferences, but we distinguish an internal process of preference from
its behavioral outcome. For example, neurons in the anterior protocerebrum of female Gryllus
bimaculatus crickets ﬁre at different rates depending on the pulse duration of male calls, with
some durations producing higher ﬁring rates than others [8] (Box 2). Therefore, this neural
‘ranking’ of stimuli is represented internally and independently of its behavioral outcome. We
describe preference as ‘the cognitive encoding of a ranking of options’.
Choice
Choice is used ubiquitously in behavioral ecology. Perhaps more than any other component of a
decision-making process, choice is deﬁned as an action, such as a behavior that restricts the
potential set of mates [42], a speciﬁc type of foraging behavior that is driven by preference [43], or
the probability of settling in a particular habitat [44]. However, although these actions result from
a choice, an organism arrives at that choice before the motor activity typically measured in an
experiment. For example, an individual may choose a mate but be prevented from mating due to
the presence of a predator. Therefore, we describe choice as ‘the cognitive process of selecting
an action in the face of alternatives’.
Although no one example can illustrate all of these cognitive phenotypes perfectly, imagine the
following case. A sample of female crickets faces a choice between a conspeciﬁc and heterospeciﬁc call in a phonotaxis trial (Figure 2), and their behavior varies. Some females approach the
conspeciﬁc call, whereas others spend an equal amount of time with each call type. Multiple
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Outstanding Questions
How do cognitive phenotypes vary
among individuals, genotypes, environments, etc.?
How does each cognitive phenotype
inﬂuence and co-vary with others?
What are the proximate bases of cognitive phenotypes (i.e., mapping genotype to phenotype)?
To what extent does variation in cognitive phenotypes inﬂuence ﬁtness?
What additional cognitive phenotypes
contribute to animal decisions?

Figure 2. A Typical Phonotaxis Trial Offering A Female Cricket A Choice between Two Song Types.

hypotheses, targeting different cognitive phenotypes, could explain the difference in behavior,
and Box 1 offers guidance on testing each of these hypotheses: (i) some females are able to
discriminate between the two call types (i.e., perceive them as different), whereas other females
cannot; (ii) some females recognize one call type from prior experience and others fail to
remember it; (iii) some females categorize conspeciﬁc and heterospeciﬁc calls into different
sets, whereas others categorize them together; and (iv) some females are able to assess the
relevant features of the calls (e.g., pulse rate), whereas others cannot detect these features.
Those four hypotheses explain behavioral variation as a result of differences in judgment;
however, females also can differ in decision phenotypes: (i) some females might have a
preference for trait values that correspond with conspeciﬁc calls, whereas others rank conspeciﬁc and heterospeciﬁc calls equally; and (ii) all females might prefer conspeciﬁc calls, but some
are motivated to make a choice, while others are not, perhaps because they recently mated.
Thus, clarifying the concepts that we use to describe and quantify animal decisions facilitates
discussion and hypothesis testing within and across disciplines. Behavioral ecologists might
already implicitly acknowledge the broader distinction of the JDM framework; however, by
explicitly speaking a common language based on this framework, behavioral ecologists can
leverage existing models (e.g., Bayesian inference or optimality) and experimental designs (e.g.,
habituation–dishabituation or eye tracking) from psychology to deﬁne and characterize cognitive
phenotypes, test hypotheses about behavioral variation, and predict evolutionary outcomes in
natural systems.

Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
With carefully designed studies that distinguish cognitive phenotypes, we can identify the
genetic and neurophysiological bases of individual variation and achieve the central aim of
behavioral ecology: linking the causes of animal decisions with their ﬁtness consequences.
However, whereas the ﬁtness consequences of a decision may be relatively straightforward, its
causes have been concealed inside the black box that connects information with action. The
JDM framework begins to open that black box and provides an ontology of cognitive phenotypes that researchers can use to identify homologous phenotypes and characterize individual
variation. However, as implemented in human psychology, the JDM framework lacks an explicit
evolutionary context. Behavioral ecology provides this evolutionary perspective and can offer
predictions about which judgments are likely to be subject to selection (i.e., those that affect
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ﬁtness) and, therefore, for which we expect to observe accurate judgments [12]. Behavioral
ecology also offers a clear currency of maximization for decisions (i.e., relative ﬁtness) [45].
The core list of cognitive phenotypes discussed here presents behavioral ecologists with multiple
research directions (see Outstanding Questions). As researchers with access to the broadest
range of animal systems and decision-making contexts, behavioral ecologists are well positioned to identify the neural, physiological, and genetic bases of cognitive phenotypes, thus
advancing our understanding of how animal decisions are generated and how decision making
evolves.
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